

of dualism do not deny the usefulness of brains for our everyday living; but they do deny that minds are nothing but the subjective experiences of brain activity” (p. 181). His position in this matter is much like that of William James, Henri Bergson, or Theosophy. It is that mind-consciousness exists apart from its interaction with brain-consciousness, however important that interaction is during life.

2. The next implication is that there must be a “place” where the consciousness exists when it is not embodied and linked with a brain: “we are obliged to imagine a mental space that, necessarily, differs from the physical space with which we are ordinarily familiar. ... Existence there might have features that would seem familiar to persons who have given more than average attention to their dreams ... and to some persons who have come close to death and survived” (p. 181). The “mental space” Stevenson alludes to here will be recognized by those familiar with Theosophical teachings about the “inner” or “higher” planes of reality, which we inhabit during sleep and between lives.

3. Another implication is that some features are transmitted from one life to another: “I have found it helpful to use the word *diathanatic* (which means “carried through death”) as a term for subsuming the parts of a deceased person that may reach expression in a new incarnation. So what parts would be diathanatic? The cases I have described tell us that these would include: some cognitive information about events of the previous life; a variety of likes, dislikes, and other attitudes; and, in some cases, residues of physical injuries or other markings of the previous body” (pp. 181-2). Stevenson prefers not to use the traditional terminology of philosophical and religious systems in order to avoid any extraneous associations they may have. But his “diathanatic” is very close to the Buddhist concept of “skandhas,” the material, psychic, and mental residues that are carried over from one life to the next.

4. Yet another implication is that we must distinguish two “levels” of selfhood, one associated only with a single lifetime and another that stretches across lives: “We may understand better the loss through death of some or much of the previous personality by using the distinction between *personality* and *individuality*. By individuality I mean all the characteristics, whether concealed or expressed, that a person might have